the topic of german reunification is one widely taught in schools across the world, and for good reason. germany represented one of the central battle lines between the west and east, the capitalists and the communists, the usa versus the ussr.
the tension between west and east germany, represented in physical fashion through the berlin wall, was the most significant symbol of the cold war, and the fall of the wall is possibly the most iconic moment of the 20th century.
and yet, i would argue it is germany's original unification rather than its reunification that is a more interesting topic. spanning from the congress of vienna in 1815 to wilhelm i's pronouncement as german emperor (although not emperor of germany, as wilhelm wanted) in 1871, the topic is essential reading for those interested in understanding european history. both the expansive timeframe and amount of content prohibits the full exploration of germany's unification in this article, but i do want to touch upon a moment in german history that has been mostly overlooked, which is the january uprising in 1863 and the little known alvensleben convention that came after it. these events hold the keys to understanding just how prussia managed to forcibly unite germany under its leadership.
background
it is january 22nd, 1863, a cold night in warsaw, and gunshots ring out in the crisp winter night. a group of polish nationalists strike at a russian military convoy, injuring and killing several russian soldiers who were heading back to base for the night.
revolutions in poland were a constant thorn in the side of the rulers of prussia and russia, with events in 1794 and 1830 before the 1863 effort. the specific motivations and events of the january uprising merit their own article, but for now it can be simplified to a wish for independence from the arch-conservative leadership of russia, embodied by aleksander wielopolski, the head of the russian administration in poland.
what is more relevant to this article is the leadership situation in prussia at this time. for some basic details, prussia was ruled in a constitutional monarchy since 1848, the year of revolutions in europe. prussia's monarch at the time was king wilhelm i, and he had ruled since 1861, when his childless brother, frederick wilhelm iv, succumbed to a stroke that he had suffered in 1857. at this time a man named albrecht von roon, the minister of war, had proposed massive reform to the prussian military, causing a dispute with the prussian landtag (parliament), which almost led to the resignation of the king as the landtag refused to approve the yearly budget of 1862 in protest.
and in steps the most important man in the entire story of german unification, otto von bismarck. bismarck was by 1862 the prussian ambassador in paris, and had recently been relocated to france from the prussian embassy in saint petersburg. yet again, for the sake of keeping this article concise, i will cut down on the details of how exactly bismarck came to the office of minister-president, but simply put bismarck was seen by many in berlin as a brute who would be able to resolve the crisis with the landtag through sheer force of will.
now, you may be wondering how this can possibly relate to an uprising in poland, and if you are wondering this, let me take you on a trip inside the head of bismarck. bismarck is known as one of the great—if not the greatest—practitioner of something called 'realpolitik' the world has ever known. realpolitik is a german term used to describe conducting diplomatic or political policies based on actual conditions rather than strict adherence to ideology or morality.
at this time many in prussia saw the austrian empire as an important partner and ally in the european continent, and wished to pursue closer ties with their southern 'brother'. bismarck however saw it a bit differently. without austrian interference within the many german states that existed at this time, prussia would stand as the strongest power both militarily and economically, granting it the ability to dictate german policy and steer the smaller states towards absorption into prussia.
bismarck saw an opportunity to rule all of germany, if only austria was removed from the question.
now, for even more wider european context, in october of 1853 russia went to war with the ottoman empire, france, the uk and piedmont-sardinia, for a whole host of reasons that we will not be getting into.
importantly, austria-hungary and prussia were the two major allies of russia in the years previous to the war. as the war neared its eventual end in february of 1856, austria made their first severe blunder. facing the diplomatic equivalent of fomo, austrian diplomats had the brilliant idea to antagonise russia, with a default on austria's owed debt to russia. this relatively insignificant act made no concrete impression upon western powers to the reliability of austria as an ally, and only achieved the alienation and destruction of relations with russia.
now, as some geography enthusiasts must already know, austria is stuck between prussia and russia. any alliance with the west was deeply impractical, due to their strained relationship with france and napoleon iii (they had just fought the italians in the 2nd war of italian independence), and the limited ability of the western nations to actually get to austria, with the long trek through the mediterranean or the freezing path through the alps the only feasible routes.
now, back to prussia. bismarck saw austria as stranded between russia and prussia in europe, both physically and politically, and looked to increase their isolation on the european stage. bismarck sought to do this by advancing prussia's relationship with russia, ensuring that in the 'incredibly unlikely' event of a austro-prussian conflict russia would not intervene, allowing prussia focus the fighting on one front and defeat the austrians, giving themselves free reign in germany.
now, you might be asking, how bismarck would be able to prove to russia that prussia is a good ally to them, and will help them when they are in need.
thats right, poland. while the rebellion in 1863 was contained to the russian-controlled side of poland, upon hearing news of the rebellion, bismarck sprung into action. looking to get a treaty of cooperation with russia in regards to the uprising, bismarck authorised general gustov von alvensleben in late january to travel to st. petersburg (then the capital of russia) to the court of alexander ii. by the 8th of february alvensleben and russian foreign minister alexander gorchakov had signed a treaty agreeing to close cooperation in dealing with the uprising. the treaty, labelled the alvensleben convention, was important for this story not for its technical application (it was never even implemented), but for its international consequences.
countries such as austria, france and england immediately lodged complaints, arguing that the crackdown on the polish population was draconian and evil, and they were especially worried about the cooperation of prussia and russia. this was error n. 2 for austria. continuing to coordinate with the west merely displayed to russia that austria had shifted their loyalties away from the east, further cementing their relationship with prussia.
now, with bismarck certain who russia stood with in europe, great plans for europe began to unfold, which, to save words, led to prussia's war with austria in 1867.
now, you might think, austria being the great power it was, and with a larger population than prussia (roughly 40 million to 24 million), this war, if not won by austria, would be a grinding affair. you would be wrong. austria had their ass handed to them, in a conflict that lasted all of seven weeks and saw prussia, with their modern military theory and advanced railway system, destroy the austrian army in each battlefield.
blah blah, more internal german politics followed, but the future was cast in stone after this war. prussia was the dominant force in the middle of europe, which meant nothing stood in it's way in the german states.
and so, after so many years of conflict and strife, prussia united all german states under the prussian king wilhelm i on the 18th of january, 1871.
bismarck could never fight austria and france without russian non-interference, and the way he guaranteed this was through utilising the january revolution to prove his alliance to tsar alexander i.
bismarck was the supreme practitioner of realpolitik, and in the eyes of the polish uprising he saw the future of germany.